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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the 
Adoption of 
PETER KELLY McKINSTRAY and 
MELODY DAWN McKINSTRAY, 
Minors. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 17035 
This is an action seeking a determination that th~ 
Appellant, Dale R. McKinstray, has abandoned his natural 
children Peter Kelly McKinstray and Melody Dawn McKinstray 
and that he should therefore be deprived of all parental 
rights and responsibilities arising from his fatherhood and 
that the petition for adoption by the children's step-father 
should be granted without the consent of the Appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court, Hon. David B. Dee, 
Judge, heard this matter without jury and adjudged that the 
Appellant natural father has abandoned his two natural 
children, that Appellant be deprived of all parental rights 
of every kind regarding his children, and that the adoption 
sought by the petitioners in this matter, the children's 
natural mother and step-father, proceed without the consent 
of the children's natural father. 
In a post-judgment motion the Appellant sought amendment 
to the Findin£s of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and 
L;-~ ::-;, :' '.,' /<:: '~,I 
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-2-
sought the taking of addi~ional testimony in behalf of 
Appellant, or in the alternative sought a new trial, all 
of which were denied by the trial court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks first a remand to the trial court for 
the taking of addition testimony as prayed in Appellant's 
post-trial motion and for the amendment of the Findings of 
Fact particularly as would relate to the credibility of 
witnesses appearing. Appellant further seeks a reversal of 
the judgment of the court below such that Appellant not be 
adjudged to have abandoned his children and that he has 
the rights and.responsibilities attendant to his status as 
the non-custodial natural father of the children. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The natural parents of the children involved in this 
action, Dale R. McKinstray and Nadine Ann McKinstray Suesser-
man, were married in 1965, had born as issue of their marriage 
Peter (b. Feb. 28, 1968) and Melody (b. Aug. 15, 1967), and 
were divorced January 6, 1970 (R. · 5; Exhibit 1). Nadine 
subsequently married Irwin Raymond Suesserman (R. 5). 
Under the terms of the McKinstray divorce (R. 7-9; Exhibit 1), 
custody of the children was granted to their mother "subject 
to the right of reasonable visitation at reasonable times and 
places by the [Appellant] Dale R. McKinstray including the 
right to have said minor children visit with him at reasonable 
times and places" (R. 8). Mr. McKinstray was placed under an Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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obligation of support for the children on a graduated basis, 
i.e., $30 per month per child for the year 1970, $35 per 
month per child for 1971, $40 per month per child for 1972, 
$45 per month per child for 1973, adn $50 per month per child 
for all years thereafter (R. 8-9) . 
From late 1972 until February, 1973, the children 
and their mother lived in California (Trans. 9). Mr. Mc-
Kinstray did not know their location until just before they 
moved (Exhibit 7), which turned out to be to Jackson, Wyoming. 
Mrs Suesserman admitted that Mr. McKinstray needed the 
services of an attorney to extract from her the location of 
the children (Trans. 36). According to Mr. McKinstray's 
understanding she was to therafter supply him with a current 
address upon moving (Exhibit 7; Trans. 166-167). Mr. McKinstray's 
parents were also to be informed (Exhibit 12). Mrs. Suesserman 1 
admitted (Trans. 35) to having never supplied an address other 
than the California address from which she was moving and the 
post office box number (Trans. 35) which was not her address 
at all but was her parents' mailing address (Trans. 38). 
Prior·to the children moving with their mother to 
California in late 1972 and while the children were still in 
Jackson, Mr. McKinstray called the McGuire home (the maternal 
grandparents) and visited with the children there (Trans. 10, 
44). Visitation had come to be required of the Appellant to 
be~,at the paternal grandparents' home (Trans. 179). 
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Sometime before Easter, 1973, Mr. McKinstray and his 
second wife, Margie, moved to Worland, Wyoming, about 200 to 
250 miles from Jackson. (Trans. 80). The move was necessitated 
by the removal of his employer from Jackson;. 1.to Worland (Trans. 
87). He began working as a long-haul over-the-road truck 
driver there and has lived in Worland to the present (Trans. 
80). In spite of the necessity of taking two days off of 
work to visit his children for a few hours in Jackson (Trans. 
161) Mr. McKinstray, having recently paid just over $1,000 
to bring his child support up to date, or nearly so, went with 
his wife to Jackson to visit the children just before Easter 
of 1973 (Trans. 161; Exhibits 1-3). From Jackson he telephoned 
his ex-wife Nadine to request a visit with his children. 
Nadine claims not to recall the telephone call (Trans. 33~) 
but Mr. McKinstray testified that she told him that she didn't 
think that it was a good idea for him to visit the children 
(Trans. 161). Mr. McKinstray then went to their school to 
visit them and give them Easter baskets (Trans. 161-162, 110). 
That visit turned out to be the last visit Mr. McKinstray had 
with the children prior to the hearing of the present action 
(Trans. 14). In september, 1973, Mrs. Suesserman and the 
children moved to Denver, Colorado, for ten months, from which 
they moved to St. Louis, Missouri, where they lived for the 
five years prior to their move to Salt Lake City in October, 
1979 (Trans. 20). The children were said to have spent summers 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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in Jackson in 1973, '74, '75, '76, and '77 with their 
maternal grandparents, the McGuires (Trans. 21) but neither 
Nadine Suesserman (Trans. 37) nor her mother, Nadine McGuire 
(Trans. 21, 49-50) ever notified Mr. McKinstray nor the other 
members of the McKinstray family that the children made summer 
visits to 1 :Jackson (re father, Trans. 163; grandmother, 135-136; 
uncle, 100) nor did they have any independant knowledge of the 
summer visits. In all those sununers while the children were 
growing and developing, Peter from age 5 through 10 and Melody 
from age 6 through 11, when Mrs. McGuire had the children 
living with her, she did not stop at the McKinstray family home 
for any reason (Trans. 50), never contacted the McKinstrays 
regarding the children being in town (Trans. 49-50, 100/ 135-
136), didn't stop for visits for the children when they 
claimed to have seen the McKinstray family members (Trans. 53), 
nor even talk with any McKinstray family members (Trans. 53). 
Neither Dale, the Appellant herein, nor any McKinstray family 
member was informed of the Mcuire family move to Montana in 
1978 (Trans. 53). Nadine's remarriage, to Mr. Suesserman, in 
1975 (Trans. 5) was not mentioned to the McKinstrays (Trans. 53) 
and Mr. McKinstray did not learn of his ex-wii.fe 's new married 
name "Suesserman" until the service of the pleadings in this 
case upon him (Trans. 164) in October, 1979 (R. 13). There 
was no mention to any McKinstray of the children being in 
Jackson in the sununer of 1978, even though they were there 
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periodically in moving the McGuires to Montana during that 
summer (Trans. 21-22). The McKinstray family home has been 
at the same address for 36 years (Trans. 124), which was 
known to the McGuire family (Trans. 34,.43) and which was 
driven past on occasion by the McGuires (Trans. 45). Yet the 
McGuires, the custodial family of the children, failed and 
refused over those many years to take any minimal steps what-
ever to inform the KcKinstrays or Dale McKinstray of the 
presence of the children so that visitation could take place. 
This was all in keeping with an antagonistic attitude held on 
the part of Mrs. McGuire, the maternal grandmother. She had 
a dislike of Dale McKinstray because "he got her pregnant," 
~.1dn' t want Nadine to marry Dale nor indeed to have anything 
to do with him (Trans. 51). 
Gladys McKinstray, the paternal grandmother, last had 
visitation with the children in November, 1972 (Trans. 126). 
It was the last.visit because of an incident (Trans. 133-135) 
involving Mrs. McGuire and the children's visit to the McKin-
stray home. That afternoon when the time came for the children 
to return to the McGuire residence Melody did not want to go 
and wanted to and did call Mrs. McGuire on the telephone to ask 
to stay longer. Melody was heard by Mrs. McKinstray to say 
over the telephone "I hate you". Mrs;. McKinstray picked up 
the telephone to be told by Mrs. McGuire, "Gladys, you're 
trying to turn those kids against me and I'm coming after them," 
1 
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which she did. Mrs. McGuire's treatment of the children upon 
her arrival to pick them up from the McKinstray residence was 
such that Mrs. McKinstray resolved to "not put those little 
kids through that any more." (At this time Melody would have 
been 5 years old and Peter 4.) The next month when Mrs. 
McKinstray had Christmas gifts for the chi~dren (Exhibits 15, 
16, 17 and 18, which were on the court's motion returned to 
Mrs. McKinstray at the conclusion of the trial, Trans. 180) 
she did not know where to send them (Trans. 127). The children 
were in fact in Ontario, California with their mother (Trans. 9) 
which was the time when Mrs. Suesserman referred to in admitting 
that Mr. McKinstray had to use an attorney to get the address 
of the children (Trans. 36) and which address was received by 
Dale McKinstray (Exhibit 7) and his by his parents (Exhibit 12) 
sometime in February, 1973, as mentioned above. Again in 1973 
Mrs. McKinstray had Christmas gifts for the children but did 
not know where to sent them (Trans. 127). At this time the 
children were living in Denver (Trans. 20) without the McKin-
strays or any of them having been informed. 
Mr. McKinstray sought counsel in late 1972 and early 
1973 as to what he should do regarding Nadine and his problems 
in visiting the children, even after having paid over $1,000 
in child support, and was advised by his attorney to wait 
for Nadine to calm down and to let more time go by before he 
did anything (Trans. 166). This was three years after the 
divorce and at a time when he had to engage the services of Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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an attorney to get an address that was to be current for 
only a brief period. Shortly thereafter, at Easter in 1973, 
Mr. McKinstray did try again to visit but was rebuffed and he 
then sought out the children at their school. He believed 
after seeing that time, however, that it would be in their 
best interests not to contact them ~{Trans. 171} becausE!:! of 
the hostility of the maternal family (Trans. 177). -- He believed 
also that after they moved from Jackson, which he had heard 
abobt after the Easter visit (Trans. 176) his ex-wife would 
not tell him where the children were even if he paid his 
child support obligations up to date (Trans. 168), which was a 
reasonable belief given his recent experience of paying and 
still having to resort to an attorney for an address, even 
though that address was temporary. During the entire period 
from 1970 though the date of the trial Mr. McKinstray kept 
in force two insurance policies on his life with premiums 
of $136 per year paid up;to date with the children as the 
sole beneficiaries (Trans. 159~ Exh£bits 9, 10 & 11) since 
1970 (Trans. 166). Mr. McKinstray testified that he never 
in the time since seeing his children had an intent to 
~elinquish his responsibilites regarding the children nor to 
give up any rights (Trans. 171) and wants to establish a 
parental relationship with the children (Trans. 171). 
The evidence shows that Nadine and the McGuire family 
knew of how to get in touch with Dale McKinstray and further 
that they knew specifically of where he lived, namely in Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Worland. Dale had come from Worland to Jackson for the Easter 
1973 visit, Melody had earlier called their Worland telephone 
number (Trans. 119) and the Summons and Complaint were served 
personally·upon Mr. McKinstray at his home in Worland (R. 12; 
Trans. 168). Upon being served Mr. McKinstray contacted the 
attorney for his ex-wife and told him that he wanted to talk 
with his children (Trans. 169-170). 
Of great significance are Mr. McKinstrays personality 
traits of being quiet and reserved, a person who kept his 
troubles to himself (Trans. 108, 111, 124) and w~o grieved 
for his lack of contact with his children. Mr. McKinstray 
becomes particularly quiet and withdrawn on Melody's and 
Peter's birthdays and on children-oriented holidays, such as 
Easter, Christmas and Halloween (Trans. 111-112). He is so 
because he misses his children (Trans. 123) and has done so 
every year 'til now (Trans. 121) as testified to by the members 
of his family, his wife, his brother, his mother, and wants to 
"see his kids" (.Trans. 107). He even withdraws when he drives 
past the street the McGuires and his children lived on (Trans. 
121). Mr. McKinstray's wife testified that Dale told her 
sometime not long after the 1973 Easter visit that he didn't 
want to have any more children because he didn't want to risk 
the pain and agony of not having his children (Trans. 117-118), 
of losing them as well. 
Upon learning of his children's whereabouts with the 
instigation of this action, Mr. McKinstray sent Christmas Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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gifts to his children (Trans. 22) which were refused by the 
Suessermans as was the child support payment of December, 1979 
(Exhibit 19). Nadine had several years ago told Dale that 
she did not want support money (Trans. 165) and Dale had also 
heard that the children had already been adopted (Trans. 144) 
several years ago. 
Shirley Baldwin is a mutual acquaintance of Dale and 
Nadine. She was referred to in testimony by witnesses as 
being one who occasionally knew about the children (Trans. 104, 
106, 127) and could tell McKinstrays about them. The Appellant 
made diligent inquiry as to her whereabouts prior to the time 
of trial. She was located in Cornville, Arizona, several 
weeks after the conclusion of the t~ial (Transcript of Hearing 
dated April 16, 1980, p.4). The substance of her testimony 
was unknown until counsel for Appellant spoke with her by 
telephone after the trial's conclusion which was to the effect 
that Nadine had spoken with her, Shirley Baldwin, and told her 
that Dale would never see the children, was angry that D.ale 
had paid up the back child support at the end of 1972 because 
here expressed intention was to get Dale so far in arrears in 
child support ana that she would not let him see the children 
and thus have a gradual abandonment (Transcript of Hearing, p. 
4). Counsel for Appellant offered to submit supporting 
affidavits regarding the above matters and the others referred 
to in argume~ts to the court, especially regarding Nadine's 
representations that neither Dale nor Gladys McKinstray would Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-11-
see the children again, but was not required by the court to 
do so. The court ruled against the taking of the said additional 
testimony. Appellant also sought Findings by the court regarding 
credibility of witnesses. All of Appellant's requests to the 
court were denied. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT FOR THE-TAKING OF ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY OF SHIRLEY BALDWIN. 
Appellant offered to p~ovide the court with his 
supporting affidavit regarding the newly discovered evidence 
in the form of testimony from Shit.ley Baldwin. The Appellant 
showed or offered to show that the evidence was discovered 
since the ttial, that Appellant exercised due diligence in 
seeking it out prior to the trial but did not discover the 
evidence before the trial, that the evidence was material to 
the issues of the Appellant's defenses to the Complaint and 
Petition and was such that it probably would have changed the 
result of the trial. As stated in the facts, the testimony 
was of a specific plan on the part of Nadine Suesserman of 
hindrance to the Appellant in exercising his parental rights 
from an early date. The witness was willing to travel from 
Arizona to Salt Lake City should the court have allowed her 
testimony. In a trial wherein the standard of proof is "clear 
and convincing evidence" and where that burden has been held 
to have been met in a matter so serious as the termination of Sponsor d by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institut  of Museu  and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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all parental rights and the elements necessary for the 
taking of additional testimony have been met, it is incumbent 
upon the oourt to hear additional evidence, especially where 
as here the testimony will be from a disinterested witness. 
This case should be remanded forthe taking of the proffered 
additional testimony. 
POINT II. THIS MATTER SHOULD BE REMANDED TO THE TRIAL 
COURT FOR\ THE MAKING OF ADDITIONAL FINDINGS REGARDING THE 
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES OR OF OBVIATING THE NECESSITY THEREFORE. 
This point is concededly a novel one and one which 
Appellant recognizes may be without merit. No case law has 
been found in support of it and, indeed, it seems many cases 
have treated it by implication. Nevertheless, the Constitution 
of Utah, Article VIII, Section 9, states "In equity cases the 
appeal may be on questions of both law and fact ..•. " This being 
an equity case the reviewing court will give consideration to 
the findings of fact of the trial court and will not disturb 
those findings unless it appears that the trial judge made 
findings against the weight of the evidence. Peterson v. 
Peterson, 112 U. 554, 190 P.2d 135. 
The credibility or lack thereof of the witnesses is an 
issue necessarily precedent to the finding of facts based upon 
the testimony of witnesses. The court below was specifically 
requ~sted to make findings regarding the credibility of witnesses · 
(Transcript of Hearing, April 16, 1980, pp. 5-6). While this Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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present case is reviewable on the facts and the law, its 
review is circumscribed by the traditional rules regarding the 
review of evidence, e.g., that the reviewing court will not 
disturb findings unless it appears that the trial judge made 
findings against the weight of the evidence, or, for another 
example, the reviewing court will assume that the trial court 
believed those aspects of the evidence which support its 
findings and judgment, Robertson v. Hutchison, 560 P.2d 1110 
(Utah 19 77) . 
The foregoing examples are different standards for 
reviewing evidence in seeming to require different quanta 
for the reversal or modification of a lower court decision. 
In cases up for review wherein the degree of proof required 
at trial is a mere preponderance of the evidence there is a 
substantial leeway built in to the trial court's ev~dence­
weighing and decision-making such that broad discretion is 
granted and few, if any, judgment reversals will be made, 
regardless of the merits of the losing party!s case. In cases 
wherein the degree of proof is more stringent, however, such 
as by "clear and convincing" evidence, there is much less 
leeway or discretion in the evidence-weighing and decision-
making discretion of the trial court in which it may take 
refuge. The present matter seems to be such a case. The 
degree of proof required is "clear and convincing" evidence 
R>bertson v. Hutchison~_S~Er~, at 1112. The elements which 
need to be proved in this case, set out in Point III below, Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization pr vided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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seem to be subject to differing standards of proof. It seems 
to Appellant that where a more stringent standard of proof is 
required the decision should be subject to a more stringent 
standard of proof. This indeed is the case when comparing 
criminal case review with civil case review in general. But 
this court in Robertson adopted for that case a rather lax 
standard for review, that of assuming that the trial court 
believed those aspects of the evidence which support the 
findings. While it appears that a lax standard for review 
is not appropriate for a case with a stringent standard for 
trial proof, in the present case we should concern ourselves 
with a situation where there is a stringent standard of trial 
proof and a specific request for specific findings regarding 
the credibility of ~witnesses, the very foundation for the 
findings 0f fact. It appears that inconsonant standards for 
trial and for review is a denial of due process of law in 
violation of the Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 7, 
and .o& the Coitist_itution of the United States, Amendment XIV, 
Section 1, and further-of the equal protection of laws guar-
anteed by the Consitution of Utah, Afticle I, Section 7, and 
of the Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, 
Section I. Without a consistent application of review 
standards consonant with trial standards arbitrariness tends 
to enter the review process, or at least there may not be a 
rational relationship between the standards of trial and the 
standards of review. In either case justice tends to become Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the In titute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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less than just. Without findings regarding credibility in 
a case such as this one does not know whether one lost on the 
facts or on the law, and if on the facts upon which facts. 
Given the high standard at trial required and the great 
personal loss to an individual deprived of his parental rights 
it appears that the standards for findings~ and hence for 
review, should be stringent when requested. Surely little 
administrative burden is added and a step nearer ideal or 
true justice will be taken. This court should remand to the 
trial court for the entry of findings on credibility of the 
witnesses or other findings obviating the necessity thereof 
such as by the finding of specific facts supporting each 
element 06 the prevailing party's required proofs. 
POINT III. THE EViIDENCE UNDER APPLICABLE STATUTORY 
AND CASE LAW WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
TRIAL COURT AND THE JUDGMENT SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED. 
A. Statutory Law: 
The applicable Utah Code provision under which the 
petitioner sought to have a declaration of abandonment is 
Section-78-30-5, which states as follows; 
Consent unnecessary where parent failed to support 
or communicate with child.--
The child may be adopted without;the consent of the 
parent or parents, when the district court in which 
the proceedings are pending determines, after notice 
to such parent or parents in a manner determined by 
the court, that the parent or parents, having the 
ability and duty to do so, have not provided support 
and have made no effort or only token effort without 
good. cause to maintain a parental relationship with 
~~~~; :~is a rebuttable presumpti0n that no 
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effort has been made if the parent or parents have 
failed to support and communicate with the child 
for a period of one year or longer. 
The Utah legislature has set out several elements to 
be shown in order to find that a parnet has "abandoned" his 
child in such a manner as would allow an adoption to be made 
over his objection. For illustrative purposes these are set 
forth below in separately numbered elements. 
A ch.iild may be adopted without the consent of the parent 
a. when the district court in which the proceedings 
are pending determines 
b. after notice to such parent or parents 
c. in a manner determined by the court 
d. that the parent having the ability to provide 
support, and 
e. having the duty to provide support 
f. has not provided support 
g. and has made no effort or only token effort 
h. without good cause 
i. to maintain a parental relationship with the child. 
This Supreme Court has been called on in the past to 
review cases such as this and has added further criteria which 
must be met in order for a parent to be deemed to have "abandoned'I 
his child. In a unanimous opinion this court in upholding a 
finding of no abandonment applied the following considerations: 
j. It is and should be the policy of the law to support 
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preservation of the parent child relationship 
and by being reluctant to interfere with or 
destroy it. 
The court will find an abandonment 
k. only when the evidence is clear and convincing 
1. that the parent has either expressed an intention 
m. or so conducted himself 
n. ,as to clearly indicate 
o. an intention 
p. to relinquish parental rights 
q. and reject parental responsibilities of his child 
Subsequent to the Robertson case this court in another 
unanimous decision affirmed the Robertson case stating that 
It is nevertheless necessary that it be 
show.n that there was an intent coupled 
with acts or conduct constituting a 
desertion or an abandonment. Hall v. Anderson, 
562 P.2d 1250 at 1251. (Emphasis added) 
In Robertson and Hall this court also reviews the 
r. best interests of the child (Robertson at 1113; 
Hall at 1251) 
In these cases the Court looked at the interests of the 
children and in them found that the children were loved, 
wanted, and well-cared-for in their living circumstances and 
determined that the "only thing actually involved is the 
technical legal status as to [the child} and the proposed 
adoption is mostly a matter of the psychological affect because 
of that status." Robertson at 1113. Later, in the Hall case Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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the court found that the failure to find an abandonment by 
the parent "does not involve any actual 'disruption' of the 
child living in or here adjustment in that home. As we stated 
in the Roberson case, supra: 
[s.] We do not see any likelihood that there will!be 
a change of custody or any substantial interference 
with the desireable circumstances in which she is 
living. Hall at 1251. 
In the present case we have before the court a situation 
where the parties resided in Jackson, Wyoming, and became 
divoxced. The father's work took bim to a new residence 200 
miles away in Wyoming while the mother took the children to 
California, Colorado, Missouri and Utah, the last three without 
the ~nowledg~ of the father until well after the fact. The 
children were apparently in Wyoming for several summers but 
that fact was not known to the father nor the members of his 
family, although they could have easily been apprised of that 
fact by the custodial family. The father was not allowed to 
visit with his children unless child support were paid, and then 
in the later days only at the house of the maternal grandmother, 
who admitted antipathy towards the father, and still later after 
support was paid still no visitation was cooperated in nor 
addresses of the children provided. The father had been wagin~ 
a losing battle against the mother and her family by the time 
the mother and children moved out of the state. The father had 
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down, a time three years after the divorce. The question 
in this case comes down to How much does a father have to bear 
in his relationship to his children; is the mother to be rewarded 
for her wrongful behaviour and the father punished for caring for 
the children enough to back away and avoid conflicts in their 
lives, a man who believed it in their best interests not to 
contact them it would raise with their mother? It seems that 
a prima facia case for "good cause" (item# 'h', supra) has 
been made and that the burden and presumption, should then shift 
back t.o the: petitioners to show abandonment. Even if the burden 
or presumption does not shift back, the Appellant nevertheless 
has no'b "clearly indicated" (item# 'n') an "intention" (item 
# 'o') to "relinquish parental rights" (item# 'p'), etc. 
The only evidence regarding the "best interests of the 
children" (item# 'r') was from the prospective adopting father 
who testified that although married to the children's mother in 
1975 (Trans•.: 5) . he had_; 1ived ·in the same home as the children 
since 1973 (Trans. 95) and thau he loves the children, intends 
to care for them and that his relationship with the children 
will not be changed should an adoption not be granted (Trans. 96), 
a circumstance similar to the Robertson and Hall cases. There 
was not a clear and convincing proof made as to the elements 
necessary as set forth in the statute and the cited cases. 
- -:. - - -Otlier elements wherein Appellant sees a less-than-sufficient 
quantum, particularly in light of the uncontradicted nature of 
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e. duty to privide support--Nadine told the 
Appellant that she did not want child support 
and Appellant may not therefore be held to as 
high a standard as would otherwise obtain, even 
if he did in fact have a continuing obligation. 
Under the law ("Ignorance of the law is no 
excusen) the Appellant may have had a continuing 
duty but his attempts at visitation became frustrated 
and had precious little recognizable leverage to 
use in maintaining his parental relationship. 
f. has not provided support--Throughout these many 
years Appellant paid insurance premiums in behalf 
of the children as beneficiaries in spite of having 
remarr~ed and thus with a new wife to support. 
His attempts at visitation were frustrated arid he 
had reasonable cause to believe that Nadine and 
family were guilty of bad faith in their dealings 
with him regarding the children and his family. 
g .. has made no effort or only token effort--To the 
extent Appellant's efforts were token or non-
existent, they were a result of difficulties between 
Appellant and his former wife and her family and 
which Appellant wanted to protect his children from. 
Appellant relied upon the counsel of his attorney 
to give Nadine time, which, as it turned out with 
N d . ' . was ot we 1 1 +- ~ k ~ n . a ine s moving, n -- ---~-~~~ · 
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Appellant Dale McKinstray respectfully submits that 
he is entitled to have his family ties to his children 
strengthened rather than destroyed, that his rights of visitation 
and responsibilities as he may have, be confirmed and that 
he be declared not to have abandoned his children. 
____. 
Respectfully submitted this ~- day of September, 1980. 
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